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WILLS-RENUNCIATION IN BEHALF OF
INCOMPETENT WIDOW
Testator made provisions for his physically helpless and hope-
lessly insane widow which in retrospect seem shockingly inadequate.
The widow's guardian filed bill in equity for renunciation of the
will. The trial court accepted, in lieu of renunciation, a plan pro-
posed by four legatees setting up a special trust for the widow. On
appeal by the guardian, held: first, that renunciation must be by
the court and not by the guardian; and second, that under the Vir-
ginia statutes a court of equity has no authority "to accept or enter
into a business arrangement or contract which neither renounces
the provisions of the will, nor allows them to operate as drawn by
the testator," and that therefore, on the facts of the case, renuncia-
tion must be decreed. First Nat. Exchange Bank of Roanoke v.
Hughson et al. 74 S.E.2d 797 (1953).
On both points the decision is one of first impression in Vir-
ginia. The first point, that renunciation must be by the court and
not by the guardian, assumes, properly, that there can be renuncia-
tion in behalf of the incompetent widow. There is no reason to
criticise the holding that under the Virginia Code1 such funda-
mental action should be taken by the court rather than by the
guardian.
In reaching the decision on the second point, that such a plan
can not be adopted, the opinion of the majority of the court makes
use of what Professor Walter Wheeler Cook stigmatized as "rea-
soning by imaginary horribles" to present a singularly weak and
erroneous argument:
"If the interested legatees be allowed to propose a plan for
the court to accept, then there is no good reason why
others who would probably be the heirs and distributees
of the hopelessly insane widow, should not propose a
plan."
The opinion continues:
"That character of barter and trading on or with the es-
tate left by the testator, the bequests and devises left to
the incompetent and other parties, and the statutory rights
of the widow, to say nothing of the potential interests of
I. V. Code Ann. 1 64-13 (1950).
the incompetent's prospective distributees, is not contem-
plated by sections 64-13, 64-16, and 64-27."'2
The objection to the majority holding is forcefully set forth
in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Buchanan, in which he
was joined by Mr. Chief Justice Hudgins:
"Cases may well arise in which there would not be the
slightest doubt that it would be to the interests of the
incompetent to accept an arrangement offered by other
beneficiaries of the will rather than to renounce the will." 3
No legalistic interpretation of the Virginia statutes can justify
attributing to courts of equity incapacity to further the interests of
the incompetent through the adoption of such a plan. The majority
holding goes contra to the entire history of courts of equity, and to
the historic doctrine, which may be said to be the entire basis of
courts of equity, that equity will fashion whatever relief is neces-
sary for the attainment of complete justice, taking all factors into
consideration, and creating whatever exceptions are necessary to
strict rules of law, whether or not set forth in statutes. Equity does
what legislators would have done if they had had the specific prob-
lems in mind. Where would the doctrine of part performance, for
example, be if courts of equity had felt themselves helpless in the
presence of a statute?
It is true that if courts of equity consider such plans they will
be confronted with the very difficult question to what extent con-
sideration should be given to the interests of those who will take
through the widow if the will is renounced. The correct solution
would seem to be to hold that the interests of the widow are para-
mount, but that, insofar as there is no conflict, the interests of those
who will take from her are to be considered. They should be per-
mitted to propose counter-plans, the very "imaginary horrible" con-
jured up by the majority opinion. There would still be difficult de-
cisions to make in working this out, but they should not be beyond
the capacity of courts of equity.
This unfortunate decision, indicating that a state of sterility has
descended upon equity in Virginia, may have the beneficial by-
product that it will help to hasten the end of the energy-wasting
anachronistic maintenance of separate courts of law and equity.
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